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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the entry of a Summary Judgment in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. This Court 
has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), as amended. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the lower court err in ruling that the Appellee 
was the "surviving spouse" of the Decedent pursuant to §75-2-803, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended? 
2. Is the Appellee an heir of the Decedent, Russell S. 
Farrell? 
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APPLICABLE STATUTE 
§75-2-803 provides as follows: 
(1) A person who is divorced from the decedent or whose 
marriage to the decedent has been annulled is not a 
surviving spouse unless, by virtue of a subsequent 
marriage, he is married to the decedent at the time of 
death. A decree of separation which does not terminate 
the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for 
purposes of this section. An interlocutory decree of 
divorce or annulment is a divorce or annulment for the 
purposes of this section. 
(2) For purposes of parts 1, 2, 3, and 4 of this chapter 
and of section 75-3-203, a surviving spouse does not 
include: 
(a) A person who obtains or consents to a final 
decree or judgment of divorce from the decedent or an 
annulment of their marriage, which decree or judgment is 
not recognized as valid in this state, unless they 
subsequently participate in a marriage ceremony 
purporting to marry each to the other, or subsequently 
live together as man and wife: 
(b) A person who, following a decree of judgment 
of divorce or annulment obtained by the decedent, 
participates in a marriage ceremony with a third person; 
or 
(c) A person who was a party to a valid proceeding 
concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital 
property rights. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a probate proceeding filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah by the 
Petitioner-Appellee, Phyllis Farrell. (R.2) On August 22, 1990, 
Petitioner filed a document entitled "Petition for Determination 
of Heirs" in which she sought an order from the Court determining 
her to be the surviving spouse of the Decedent, Russell S. Farrell. 
(R.31) The Appellants, comprising all the natural children of the 
Decedent, filed an Objection to the Petition for Determination of 
Heirs on September 12, 1990. (R.33) Thereafter, a Motion for 
Summary Judgment was brought by the Petitioner-Appellee. (R.41) 
After the filing of appropriate memoranda and oral argument, the 
court below entered an Order granting the summary judgment of 
Petitioner-Appellee and determining Phyllis Farrell to be the 
"surviving spouse" of the Decedent. (R.86) This appeal of that 
Order was taken by Appellants on December 26, 1990. (R.89) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellants are the adult children of the Decedent Russell 
S. Farrell. Russell was previously married to Thelma G. Farrell, 
which marriage was terminated by a decree of divorce entered a 
number of years previous to the facts relevant to this case. The 
Appellee was married to Russell following his divorce from Thelma. 
The following facts are undisputed and established by the record: 
1. Phyllis and Russell Farrell met in 1975. They were 
married on April 22, 1978. (R.44) 
2. In early 1989, Phyllis and Russell separated and 
determined to obtain a divorce. (R.59) 
3. The summons and complaint for divorce was filed by 
Phyllis against Russell in the Third Judicial District Court on or 
about April 7, 1989. (R.59) 
4. The parties stipulated to the entry of the divorce 
and to a property settlement. Russell, the Decedent, signed a 
document entitled "Acceptance of Service, Appearance, Consent and 
Waiver" on the 8th day of April, 1989, which document was filed for 
record in the Third Judicial District Court on May 19, 1989. Said 
document provides as follows: 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Russell S. Farrell, having 
received a copy of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint in the 
above-entitled matter, and having read the allegations 
contained therein, and being aware of his right to seek 
legal advice, herewith enters his appearance, consents 
to the personal jurisdiction of the Court, waives the 
statutory time in which to answer or otherwise respond 
to Plaintiff's Complaint, and consents that judgment by 
default may be entered against him at any time and 
without further notice to him. (R.60) 
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5. Following the execution by Decedent of the 
Acceptance, he moved to the State of Alaska and commenced full-time 
employment as a merchant seaman. Russell Farrell never returned 
to the State of Utah. (R.60) 
6. The divorce action was originally set for default 
July 7, 1989, exactly 91 days following the filing of the 
Complaint. Because Phyllis failed to appear at the hearing, a new 
default hearing was set for July 10, 1989. Again, Phyllis failed 
to appear and the matter was reset for default hearing on August 
21, 1989. (R.60) 
7. At all times subsequent to Russell's execution of the 
document consenting to the divorce, the Decedent believed himself 
to be divorced from the Appellee and so conducted his affairs. 
(R.61) 
8. Upon the expiration of the mandatory ninety-day 
waiting period, there was no legal impediment to the entry of the 
divorce. 
9. Russell Farrell died on August 15, 1989, when the 
boat upon which he was employed capsized. (R.51) 
10. A Decree of Divorce was entered terminating the 
marriage of Russell and Phyllis on August 25, 1989, pursuant to the 
default hearing which had been held on August 21, 1989. (R.52) 
11. Neither the Appellee nor the children had any 
knowledge of the death of Russell until sometime following August 
21, 1989. 
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12. The Decree of Divorce was set aside and vacated on 
October 2, 1989, pursuant to the motion of Appellee. (R.52) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellants contend that the trial court committed reversible 
error when it ruled that the Appellee, Phyllis Farrell, was the 
"surviving spouse" of the Decedent for purposes of the probate 
action. §75-2-803 was drafted as a part of the Uniform Probate 
Code, and was specifically enacted by the Utah Legislature to cover 
precisely the situation which this Court has before it. The 
statute expressly states that a surviving spouse does not include: 
(a) A person who obtains or consents to a final decree 
or judgment of divorce from the decedent or an annulment 
of their marriage, which decree or judgment is not 
recognized as valid in this state, unless they 
subsequently participate in a marriage ceremony 
purporting to marry each to the other, or subsequently 
live together as man and wife. 
At the time the Decedent left the State of Utah, he believed 
himself to be divorced. He left in the hands of his spouse, 
Phyllis, the responsibility to see that the divorce was entered. 
There was no legal impediment to the entry of a decree of divorce 
on July 7, 1989, when the default hearing was originally set. The 
only reason that the divorce was not entered prior to the death of 
the Decedent was the inaction and negligence of the Appellee. 
Accordingly, the Appellee is estopped to claim that she is 
Russell's surviving spouse for purposes of probate and is further 
estopped in her claim as an heir of the estate of Mr. Farrell. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLEE IS PROHIBITED FROM 
BEING AN HEIR OF THE DECEDENT 
It is the position of the children of the Decedent that the 
undisputed facts mandate a finding that the Appellee is not a 
"surviving spouse" of the Decedent and is therefore not entitled 
to take or share in the distribution of the Decedent's estate. It 
is patently clear that but for the inaction of the Appellee, she 
and Decedent would have been divorced long prior to the death of 
the Decedent. In the mind of the Decedent, the parties were 
divorced. To thus allow the Appellee to benefit from her own 
negligence would be patently inequitable and would be contrary to 
the desires of the Decedent. 
This precise situation was envisioned by the legislature and 
provided for in the Utah Probate Code. Section 75-2-803, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended, specifically provides that Phyllis 
Farrell is not a surviving spouse. The statute states, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
(2) For purposes of parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this chapter 
and of Section 75-3-203, a surviving spouse does not 
include: 
(a) A person who obtains or consents to a final 
decree or judgment of divorce from the decedent or an 
annulment of their marriage which decree or judgment is 
not recognized as valid in this State, unless they 
subsequently participate in a marriage ceremony 
purporting to marry each to the other, or subsequently 
live together as man and wife. 
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In order to properly apply this statute to the present 
situation, the editorial comments which follow in the Code are 
instructive. There the drafters of the legislation state: 
Subsection (1) states an obvious proposition, but 
Subsection (2) deals with the difficult problem of 
invalid divorce or annulment, which is particularly 
frequent as to foreign divorce decrees but may arise as 
to a local decree where there is some defect in 
jurisdiction; the basic principle underlying these 
provisions is estoppel against the surviving spouse. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 75-2-803 is directly applicable to the situation here 
at issue. The parties were in the process of a divorce. The 
Appellee, without knowledge of Mr. Farrell's death, obtained a 
Decree of Divorce. In Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884 (Utah 1975), this 
Court ruled that a decree of divorce entered under such 
circumstances is void. Accordingly, the District Court entered an 
order striking the earlier Decree. 
To come within the parameters of §75-2-803 the Appellee must 
be a person who (a) obtains or (b) consents to a final decree or 
judgment or divorce from the Decedent, (c) which decree is not 
recognized as valid in this State. The Appellee meets each of 
these criteria with precision. In the language of the statute, 
Appellee is "a person who obtained a final decree of divorce from 
the decedent which is not recognized as valid in this state". 
That §75-2-803 does not apply to Appellee's Decree because 
the same was void when entered is a fallacy. The editorial 
comments cited above make it clear that the Legislature intended 
to cover all situations where decrees were void, not merely 
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voidable. The comments declare that §75-2-803 is intended to cover 
decrees "where there is some defect in jurisdiction." As the Court 
is aware, where there is no jurisdiction, the action of any court 
is null and void. Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791 (Utah, 1988). 
The fact or lack of fact which causes the action to be void is 
irrelevant. In this case, the Decree of Divorce was void, thereby 
bringing into play §75-2-803. 
Section 75-2-803 is a part of the Uniform Probate Code which 
has been enacted, in similar form, in a number of states. There 
has been at least one case in which this Section has been applied 
to facts which are similar to the case at hand. In Prudential 
Insurance Company of America v. Dulek, et al, 655 F.2d 217 (8th 
Cir. 1981) the decedent's former wife attempted to collect certain 
insurance benefits payable at the death of the decedent, her former 
husband. At the time of the husband's death, the parties had 
received a preliminary divorce decree which would not become final 
for a period of six months. At the time of the death the 
preliminary decree had been entered for only two months leaving 
four months until the same would become final. 
The Circuit Court reversed a summary judgment by the lower 
Court in favor of the former wife. The Court first determined that 
the applicable state law was not the law of domestic relations but 
was rather the Nebraska Probate Code. The Nebraska Probate Code 
contained a provision which was identical to Section 75-2-803. The 
Circuit Court specifically held that under the statute the former 
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spouse was not a "surviving spouse" for purposes of distribution 
of the estate. 
Additional support for the position of the children of the 
Decedent is found in paragraph (1) of §75-2-803. The first 
sentence states the obvious proposition that a spouse who has been 
finally divorced is not a surviving spouse. However, the Utah 
Legislature substantially broadened the reach of paragraph (1) when 
it added the following language: 
An interlocutory decree of divorce or annulment is a 
divorce or annulment for the purposes of this section. 
This language was added as a part of the section in 1975, at 
a time when the standard procedure in divorce matters was to grant 
an interlocutory divorce which became final automatically at the 
expiration of ninety (90) days. While this procedure was abolished 
at the time Appellee divorced the Decedent, it is instructive as 
to the intent of the Legislature. 
Clearly, §75-2-803(1) is intended to apply not only to final 
decrees, but also to divorces which will become final at the 
expiration of a period of time. In the case at hand, the Appellee 
and Russell Farrell had consented to the entry of a decree of 
divorce. The only impediment to a final decree was the passage of 
time, nothing more. By the inclusion of the above language in §75-
2-803(1), the Legislature covered such situations. In substance 
and in effect, Appellee had an interlocutory divorce and was, 
therefore, not a surviving spouse for purposes of intestate 
succession. 
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POINT II 
APPELLEE IS BARRED AS A 
"SURVIVING SPOUSE" ON EQUITABLE GROUNDS 
Application of §75-2-803 to bar the claim of the Appellee as 
an heir of the Decedent's estate is appropriate not only because 
the clear language of the statute applies to the situation but also 
because equity demands this result. The editorial comments which 
have been cited to the Court above make note of the fact that the 
basic principles underlying the application of the statute are 
estoppel and equity. No doubt what the original drafters of the 
legislation intended to say was that it is simply unfair to grant 
a person surviving spouse status when that person has, for all 
intents and purposes, undergone a divorce with the decedent. In 
such cases, the drafters of §75-2-803 felt that the person claiming 
such status is estopped. 
These general notions of equity and estoppel were noted by the 
Eight Circuit Court in the Dulek decision. Id. at 220 (Footnote 
5). See also, Brinson v. Brinson, 334 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1964) and 
Brantley v. Skeens. 266 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1959). 
In the case at hand equitable principles demand a finding that 
the Appellee is not the surviving spouse of the Decedent. The 
parties had been separated since early in 1989. The Decedent had 
consented, in full, to a divorce and had left the State believing 
that he was divorced. The Appellee would have been granted her 
divorce in July of 1989, fully one month before the Decedent's 
death, had she simply shown up in court. Appellee has no 
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explanation or good reason why she did not appear. However, 
because she did not appear, she now seeks a potential windfall as 
the surviving spouse of the Decedent. 
It is clear that the Utah Legislature was concerned about this 
potential result when it enacted the applicable statute. It is 
also apparent that the Legislature intended to prevent such 
inequitable results when parties find themselves in a situation 
where nothing more than the passage of time stands in the way of 
the entry of a final decree. This inequity is compounded by the 
fact that the natural heirs of the Decedent are deprived of the 
limited assets of the estate through no fault of the Decedent or 
of themselves. 
A more appropriate factual situation for the application of 
§75-2-803 cannot be constructed. If the plain language of the 
statute does not bar Appellee's claim as surviving spouse, then 
principles of equity and estoppel must act as that bar. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF: 
RUSSELL S. FARRELL, 
Decedent. 
ORDER DETERMINING 
HEIRS 
Civil No. 893900994ES 
This matter came regularly before the Court on the 
16th day of November, 1990 at the hour of 10:00 a.m., the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding, for consideration 
of the Motion for Summary Judgment of Phyllis Farrell. 
Phyllis Farrel was represented by Robert H. Wilde. Duane 
R. Smith represented David Farrell, Deanne Farrell and 
Laurie Farrell. The Court having reviewed the file, the 
Memoranda and Affidavits filed pertaining to the motion 
and having taken judicial notice of file number D89-1198 
in this Court and good cause appearing therefor. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the Motion 
of Phyllis Farrell for Summary Judgment is granted and 
Phyllis Farrell is hereby determined to be the widow of 
RusselJ S. Farrell and an heir to the Estate of Russell S, 
Farrell. 
Dated this £ £ day of A/@&A$*J6<!^ , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
# 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
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